Based on the observation that industries are often geographically concentrated, this paper proposes a new political economy model of trade. We associate the sectors of a specific factors model with electoral districts populated by continua of heterogeneous voters who differ in their relative factor endowments. We show how strategic delegation leads each district to elect a representative who is more protectionist than her median voter. The government formed by a randomly selected subset of representatives sets tariffs that are on average strictly positive. Introducing additional policy instruments reveals a trade-off between efficiency and regional targetability.
We choose a (slightly modified) specific factors model because it lends itself to a regional interpretation in the context of majoritarian voting. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994) we assume quasi-linear, additive separable utility in order to keep the model tractable. Using this simplification offers the additional benefit of making our analysis comparable to theirs. The model outlined below differs from theirs, however, in that it incorporates a more explicite ownership structure necessary for our version of the political process.
A small economy comprises ¢ £ ¥ ¤ sectors that will be interpreted as electoral districts once we turn to the political side. Sectors each use a sector specific factor and one common mobile factor. The domestic price of their output is denoted by a nd the corresponding price on the world market by . The difference ! "
between both prices represents an import tariff (subsidy if negative) or an export subsidy (tax).
Sector zero is special in that it turns the mobile factor into output one-to-one.
Using its output as the numeraire, we normalize the price ! # to one. Strictly positive production in sector zero then implies that the wage of the mobile factor also equals one, as does the world market price # 
where it is assumed that per capita tariff revenue
Before turning to the political side of the story, note that utilitarian social wel-
a ttains its global maximum at " § . In other words, free trade is indeed the optimal policy for our small economy.
The political process
After having laid out the economic side of the model, this section focuses on the political process. Our point of departure is the majoritarian component enshrined in the electoral rules of most representative democracies which gives rise to a strong representation of regional interests. The representative nature of modern democracies is hardly in question. 2 As for majoritarian versus proportional representation, in many countries the former plays a direct and sometimes exclusive role in national elections. 3 Where this is not the case we often see majoritarian elements supplementing an otherwise proportional system. 4 Furthermore, the majoritarian or regional component often stems from an intermediate, How does this ubiquitousness of majoritarian elements relate to trade policy?
The crucial link is the observation that many industries are geographically concentrated. Examples abound: old industries such as coal mining or ship building have located in the obvious places, other industries cluster in particular locations due to agglomeration effects. We do not seek to explain the reasons for such behavior. We take this widespread phenomenon as given and investigate its political implications for trade policy. To this end, we associate electoral districts with the sectors of our specific factors model. The implicite assumption that an electoral district is the sole home to a single industry should not be taken literally. It is a simplification that facilitates our analysis and allows us to elucidate the effects of majoritarian voting.
The political process of our model has two stages: the election of a representative in every electoral district and the subsequent formation of the federal government from those representatives. We consider these two stages in turn. The choice of the local representative clearly depends on that person's behavior once she becomes a member of the house and possibly part of the government. We assume that so-called citizen candidates cannot commit to a particular platform. 6 but instead pursue their own personal objectives once in office. Election promises are possible but not credible and therefore irrelevant. 
The government's policy choice
Solving the model backwards, this section takes the composition of the house of representatives as given. That is, the selection of representatives in their respective electoral districts has supposedly taken place and we regard the resulting set 0 1 as exogenously given. We first investigate how a government formed from among the given set of representatives sets tariffs. Subsequently, taking into account that the composition of the government itself is random, we characterize the expected tariffs conditional on the set of representatives.
The government -randomly formed by half of the representatives -maximizes its objective function (2) 
Note that the LHS can be written as a function of one sole argument, the price of commodity ¦ , because neither of its three terms -the import tariff g C Considering the median voter is only an example, of course. 9 In general, since the RHS is strictly increasing in 0 1
, the tariff protection offered to a sector strictly increases with the local allegiance of its representative.
To understand the economic forces behind our preliminary results, it is convenient to rewrite the first order conditions:
the price elasticity of import demand in absolute value, and 1 t he ratio of domestic supply to imports. 8 Details .... distinguish concavity and increasing. The former is not essential for the strategic delegation argument below whereas the latter is sufficient but not necessary. 9 We we will show below that districts will not select the median voter to represent them. Note that the LHS is a monotone transformation of the ad valorem tariff. Written this way, the first order conditions show that a higher import demand elasticity reduces tariff protection whereas a higher ratio of domestic production to imports increases it. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994) , we have a modified Ramsey rule for setting tariffs, only that the political factors at work in our approach are different. 10
Let us return to the original formulation of the first order conditions in order to characterize the expected tariff vector. That is, we now take into account that membership in the government is a random variable. Since half the house forms the government and the other half stays out the corresponding probabilities for a given representative to become part or stay out of the government are both one half. Given our regularity assumptions on higher order derivatives, we can invert & % ' ) ( a nd express prices as a function of the political variables:
(3)
Given the above probabilities we can write the expected price as: 
Choosing representatives
Having analyzed the second stage, we now focus on the election of the local representatives that precedes it. The electorate in each of the ¢ districts has to select one of its own to represent it in the national assembly. When doing so every voter is aware of how this choice will affect the expected tariff for the local industry.
Formally, the voters' objective functions now take the form:
c an ordinary voter the median stakeholder would like to see a higher tariff than if she were part of the goverment, not to mention the equally likely case that she did not make it into the government.
The reason for these diverging policy choices is the externality a tariff for sector ¦ imposes on other districts. The tariff directly increases the profitability of the local industry but introduces a distortion that lowers consumer surplus for everyone -even net of rebated tariff revenue given that this is a small country. As part of a cooperative government the median voter would be required to internalize the effects on fellow government members, and to some extent even the effects on non-government members depending on i . As a voter participating in local elections, on the other hand, the median stakeholder ignores the externality and therefore demands higher protection for the local sector.
This demand for higher protection leads the median voter to forgo the opportunity to represent the district herself. Instead she selects a citizen candidate who is more protectionist than she herself in order to obtain the desired protection. She thus strategically delegates representation of the district to a person who is more protectionist than the median. We summarize our results so far in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In our model, each district elects a representative who is more protectionist than the median voter. The government formed from these representatives sets tariffs that are on average strictly positive. 
